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Note
THE REASONABLE GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL
TEST: A PROPOSAL FOR THE TREATMENT OF
FACTUAL INFORMATION UNDER THE
FEDERAL DELIBERATIVE PROCESS
PRIVILEGE
KIRK D. JENSEN
The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is
both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of . . . justice would
be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or specula1
tive presentation of the facts.

The deliberative process privilege2 protects the internal deliberations of officials in federal government agencies or other government
entities.3 The privilege, although a relatively recent addition to the

1.
2.

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
The deliberative process privilege is variously known as the “advice privilege,” see
ADAM CARLYLE BRECKENRIDGE, THE EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 155 (1974), the “agency policy
deliberations privilege,” see 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 108(a), at 400 (John William
Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992), the “general deliberative privilege,” see Gerald Wetlaufer, Justifying
Secrecy: An Objection to the General Deliberative Privilege, 65 IND. L.J. 845, 885-86 (1990), the
“official information privilege,” see Mark S. Wallace, Discovery of Government Documents and
the Official Information Privilege, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 142 (1976), the “predecisional
privilege,” see Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir.
1980), the “privilege for intragovernmental communications,” see In re Franklin Nat’l Bank
Sec. Litig., 478 F. Supp. 577, 580 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), and the privilege for “intragovernmental
documents,” see SCM Corp. v. United States, 473 F. Supp. 791, 797 (Cust. Ct. 1979). It is also
occasionally referred to as the “executive privilege,” undifferentiated from other executive
privileges. See, e.g., 26A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5680, at 125 (1992). The term “deliberative process privilege,”
however, seems to be gaining acceptance among courts and commentators. See id.
3. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150 (1975) (stating that “[t]he cases
uniformly rest the privilege on the policy of protecting the ‘decision making processes of government agencies’” (quoting Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657, 660 (6th Cir.
1972))).
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collection of privileges4 available to the federal executive branch,5 has
become one of the predominant governmental privileges exercised in
federal courts.6 During its short life, the deliberative process privilege
has been asserted in a wide array of litigation involving governmental
entities.7
Courts have extended the protection of the privilege to materials
that are actually related to the process by which policies are formulated8 and that, if disclosed, would “expose an agency’s decisionmaking process in such a way as to discourage candid discussion
within the agency and thereby undermine the agency’s ability to perform its functions.”9 Generally, factual material that can be separated
from opinion is not exempt from discovery under the privilege.10
Some courts, however, have extended the privilege’s protection to
facts that they believe, owing to the nature of the facts or the manner
in which the facts were gathered or summarized, would expose the
deliberative process of a government agency.11
4. Other governmental privileges include privileges protecting presidential communications, state secrets, required reports, the identity of informers, and grand jury proceedings. See
generally 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, §§ 106-13, at 422-48 (5th ed. 1999) (discussing the various privileges held by the federal executive branch).
5. See Russell L. Weaver & James T.R. Jones, The Deliberative Process Privilege, 54 MO.
L. REV. 279, 279 (1989); Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 845.
6. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that the deliberative
process privilege has become “[t]he most frequent form of executive privilege raised in the judicial arena”).
7. See Weaver & Jones, supra note 5, at 279-80 (citing cases where the privilege was invoked in “such diverse matters as the Vietnam War, Agent Orange, police abuse, draft resisters, aircraft accidents, civil service dismissals, anti-competition proceedings, petroleum price
controls, EPA lead control regulations, and customs service investigations”).
A number of commentators have questioned the grounds for the existence of a deliberative process privilege. See 26A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5680, at 131 (arguing that
the privilege rests on a “puny” policy rationale); Wetlaufer, supra note 2, passim (arguing that
the privilege should not exist); Arthur Piacenti, Note, The Deliberative Process Privilege: Preserving Candid Communications or Facilitating Evasion of Justice?, 12 REV. LITIG. 275, 283-92
(1992) (arguing that the privilege has the effect of thwarting justice rather than facilitating candid communication).
8. See Sears, 421 U.S. at 150.
9. Dudman Communications Corp. v. Department of the Air Force, 815 F.2d 1565, 1568
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
10. See Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army, 55 F.3d 827, 854 (3d Cir.
1995); City of Virginia Beach v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 995 F.2d 1247, 1253 (4th
Cir. 1993); Town of Norfolk v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 968 F.2d 1438, 1458 (1st
Cir. 1992); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Department of Justice, 677 F.2d 931, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
11. See, e.g., Gomez v. City of Nashua, 126 F.R.D. 432, 436 (D.N.H. 1989) (exempting
facts derived from “selective note-taking”); Zinker v. Doty, 637 F. Supp. 138, 140-41 (D. Conn.
1986) (same); Russell v. Department of the Air Force, 682 F.2d 1045, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
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The extension of the deliberative process privilege to protect factual information from disclosure poses a number of serious problems
both to parties litigating with the government and to the federal judiciary. Expanding the privilege to include factual information deprives
litigants of access to information relevant to litigation with the federal government, a fundamental aspect of our adversary system.12
Additionally, “[t]he very integrity of the judicial system and public
confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts,
within the framework of the rules of evidence.”13 Enlarging the
bounds of the privilege allows federal bureaucrats to shield from the
judicial process factual data, the protection of which is unjustified by
the theoretical underpinnings of the privilege.
This Note argues that the protection of factual material under
the deliberative process privilege is an unnecessary and unwarranted
extension of the privilege. Part I examines the origins and policy justifications for the privilege and discusses the substantive and procedural requirements necessary for successful invocation of the privilege. Part II examines the rationale applied by the courts in
exempting factual information from disclosure under the privilege.
Part III addresses the arguments in favor of exempting factual information from disclosure and concludes that, based on the stated justifications for the privilege and the procedural requirements already
adopted by the courts, the protection of factual information by the
deliberative process privilege is unwarranted. Part IV then proposes
alternative measures for dealing with factual material, most notably
the “reasonable government official test,” which should be applied
when the line between fact and opinion becomes blurred. This test
would establish the proper boundaries of the privilege in accordance
with its underlying rationale when the fact/opinion distinction breaks
down.
I. ORIGINS, JUSTIFICATIONS, AND REQUIREMENTS
A. History of the Privilege
As noted above, the deliberative process privilege is a relatively
new addition to the cadre of privileges available to the federal executive.14 Although at least one court has referred to the privilege as
(exempting material collected in drafting histories of the use of herbicides during the Vietnam
War).
12. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
13. Id.
14. See Weaver & Jones, supra note 5, at 279; Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 845. The delib-
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“well established by a long line of decisions,”15 this characterization
has been described as a “distortion of history.”16 Until fifty years ago,
little support for a privilege protecting deliberations among government officials existed,17 and, prior to 1958, the federal judiciary had
not adopted the deliberative process privilege.18
The origin of the privilege can be traced to two main sources:
decisions of the English courts and principles borrowed by President
Eisenhower from his military leadership experience.19 A privilege
protecting communications between government officials was
adopted as part of the “Crown privilege”20 in two decisions by the
English courts: the 1841 case of Smith v. East India Co.21 and Duncan
22
23
v. Cammell Laird & Co., decided over a century later. Although
erative process privilege is also available to state and municipal officials in federal courts, see
A. v. Giuliani, No. 95 CIV. 10533 (RJW), 1998 WL 132810, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1998)
(holding that mayors’ deliberations are privileged); Gomez, 126 F.R.D. at 435-46 (holding that
the Attorney General’s deliberations are privileged); Moorhead v. Lane, 125 F.R.D. 680, 68486 (C.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that the deliberations of corrections officials are privileged); Burka
v. New York City Transit Auth., 110 F.R.D. 660, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (acknowledging that the
deliberations of transit authority officials are privileged). Foreign government officials may
also invoke the privilege in federal courts. See LNC Invs., Inc. v. Republic of Nicaragua, No. 96
Civ. 6360 JFK RLE, 1997 WL 729106, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1997). Furthermore, the privilege has been adopted by a number of state courts. See, e.g., Capital Info. Group v. Office of
the Governor, 923 P.2d 29, 36-37 (Alaska 1996) (adopting the deliberative process privilege for
state government officials); City of Colorado Springs v. White, 967 P.2d 1042, 1050 (Colo. 1998)
(en banc) (same); McClain v. College Hosp., 492 A.2d 991, 997-98 (N.J. 1985) (same); Daily
Gazette Co. v. West Virginia Dev. Office, 482 S.E.2d 180, 189-91 (W. Va. 1996) (same). But see
District Att’y v. Flatley, 646 N.E.2d 127, 129 (Mass. 1995) (refusing to adopt the deliberative
process privilege for Massachusetts officials).
15. Sprague Elec. Co. v. United States, 462 F. Supp. 966, 971 (Cust. Ct. 1978) (citing cases
within the previous 10 years).
16. 26A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5680, at 125.
17. See William V. Sanford, Evidentiary Privileges Against the Production of Data Within
the Control of Executive Departments, 3 VAND. L. REV. 73, 78 (1949) (observing a dearth of
American authority to support a deliberative process privilege).
18. See Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 858 (“Before 1958, the general deliberative privilege . . . had never been considered by the federal courts of the United States.”).
19. See id. at 857.
20. The “Crown privilege,” analogous to our executive privilege, protects communications
regarding matters such as state secrets, parliamentary deliberations, etc. See JOHN HUXLEY
BUZZARD ET AL., PHIPSON ON EVIDENCE § 14-04, at 273-75 (13th ed. 1982), cited in Weaver &
Jones, supra note 5, at 283 n.24. The justification for the Crown privilege is “that national security and the public interest are paramount and must override the private interests of parties or
accused persons despite any resultant prejudice which may be caused to them.” Crown or State
Privilege, 3 REV. INT’L COMM’N JURISTS 29, 29 (1969), quoted in Weaver & Jones, supra note
5, at 283 n.24.
21. 41 Eng. Rep. 550 (Ch. 1841).
22. 1942 App. Cas. 624 (H.L.).

JENSEN TO PRINTER

01/12/00 11:37 AM

1999] REASONABLE GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL TEST

565

24

Smith adopted a form of deliberative process privilege, Duncan is
more closely analogous to the federal state secrets privilege.25 Indeed,
four years later the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
26
Reynolds relied heavily on the rationale and procedures expressed
in Duncan when articulating the federal state secrets privilege.27

23. Shortly after the deliberative process privilege was adopted by U.S. federal courts, the
House of Lords reversed itself and abandoned the privilege, finding its rationale to be implausible. See Conway v. Rimmer, 1 All E.R. 874 (H.L. 1968). In rejecting the privilege, Lord Morris wondered:
Would the knowledge that there was a remote chance of possible enforced production really affect candour? If there was knowledge that it was conceivably possible
that some person might himself see a report which was written about him, it might
well be that candour on the part of the writer of the report would be encouraged
rather than frustrated.
Id. at 891. Additionally, Lord Upjohn declared, “I cannot believe that any Minister or any high
level military or civil servant would feel in the least degree inhibited in expressing his honest
views in the course of his duty on some subject . . . by the thought that his observations might
one day see the light of day.” Id. at 915.
24. In Smith, documents were sought relating to the communications between the East
India Company and its government-appointed Board of Control. In concluding that a Crown
privilege applied, the House of Lords offered this justification for the deliberative process
privilege:
Now, it is quite obvious that public policy requires . . . that the most unreserved
communication should take place between the East India Company and the Board of
Control, that it should be subject to no restraints or limitations; but it is also quite
obvious that if, at the suit of a particular individual, those communications should be
subject to be produced in a Court of justice, the effect of that would be to restrain the
freedom of the communications, and to render them more cautious, guarded, and reserved. I think, therefore, that these communications come within that class of official communications which are privileged, inasmuch as they cannot be subject to be
communicated, without infringing the policy of the Act of Parliament and without
injury to the public interests.
Smith, 41 Eng. Rep. at 552.
25. The state secrets privilege exempts material critical to national security from disclosure. For a general discussion of the state secrets privilege, see 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,
supra note 2, § 107, at 423-27 (5th ed. 1999); 26 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, §§ 5664-72;
Note, The Military and State Secrets Privilege: Protection for the National Security or Immunity
for the Executive?, 91 YALE L.J. 570 (1982).
Duncan was brought by survivors of a submarine accident. The First Lord of Admiralty
refused to provide documents, claiming that they were exempt from disclosure. The House of
Lords upheld that claim. See Duncan, 1942 App. Cas. at 642. However, the language of the case
is framed in more general terms: “[T]he rule that the interest of the state must not be put in
jeopardy by producing documents which would injure it is a principle to be observed in administering justice, quite unconnected with the interests or claims of the particular parties in litigation.” Id. Although Duncan has been read to incorporate the deliberative process privilege articulated in Smith, “the textual justification for this reading is weak.” Wetlaufer, supra note 2,
at 859.
26. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
27. See id. at 12.
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Despite its judicial roots, the first appearance of the deliberative
process privilege on the federal stage was not in the courts, but rather
in the political contest between President Eisenhower and Senator
McCarthy.28 In refusing to cooperate with Senator McCarthy during
the course of the Army-McCarthy proceedings, President
Eisenhower relied not on traditional separation of powers arguments,
but rather on the deliberative process rationale.29 After its introduction by Eisenhower, the deliberative rationale caught on so quickly
within the executive branch30 that in 1957 one commentator remarked
that it seemed strange that it had not been included in earlier evidence treatises.31 Thus, the privilege was first asserted in a political
arena, not a courtroom, and it was the product of military culture, not
careful judicial reasoning or empirical evidence.32
The deliberative process privilege made its debut in the federal
courts in 1958. Justice Stanley Reed, then retired and sitting on the
Court of Claims by designation, first introduced the deliberative process privilege into the federal judiciary.33 Writing the opinion in Kai34
ser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. United States, Justice Reed justified his adoption of the privilege in part on the doctrine of sovereign

28. See Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 865-66 (recounting how President Eisenhower barred
his subordinates from providing testimony demanded by Senator McCarthy during the ArmyMcCarthy proceedings).
29. President Eisenhower argued that “‘it is essential to efficient and effective administration that employees of the Executive Branch be in a position to be completely candid in advising with each other on official matters.’” DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, Letter to the Secretary of
Defense Directing Him to Withhold Certain Information from the Senate Committee on Government Operations (May 17, 1954), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 1954, ¶ 113, at 483, 483 (1960). Further, he argued that “it is
not in the public interest that any of their conversations or communications, or any documents
or reproductions, concerning such advice be disclosed.” Id. at 483-84. Professor Wetlaufer argues that the evidence suggests that the source of these arguments was not the President’s legal
counsel, but principles of military leadership President Eisenhower brought with him from his
earlier career. See Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 867 & n.76 (providing evidence of this rationale
from Eisenhower’s military career).
30. See Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 867 & n.77 (recounting the spread of the deliberative
process rationale).
31. See id. at 867-68 & n.78 (citing Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., The Executive’s Right of Privacy:
An Unresolved Constitutional Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477, 477 (1957)).
32. See id. at 867 & n.76 (discussing the deliberative process rationale’s origins in military
culture).
33. See id. at 869 (attributing the origin of the deliberative process privilege within the
federal judiciary to Justice Reed); Weaver & Jones, supra note 5, at 286-88 (same).
34. 157 F. Supp. 939 (1958).
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immunity.35 Relying on Duncan as the sole judicial authority for the
privilege,37 Justice Reed wrote:
Free and open comments on the advantages and disadvantages of a
proposed course of governmental management would be adversely
affected if the civil servant or executive assistant were compelled by
publicity to bear the blame for errors or bad judgment properly
chargeable to the responsible individual with power to decide and
act. Government from its nature has necessarily been granted a certain freedom from control beyond that given the citizen. It is true
that it now submits itself to suit but it must retain privileges for the
38
good of all.

He relied further upon Morgan v. United States,39 in which the Supreme Court had held that it is not the function of the judiciary to
probe the mental processes of executive officials.40
Once Kaiser was decided, the deliberative process privilege
spread through the federal courts like wildfire.41 Although neither
Congress nor the Supreme Court has officially sanctioned the privilege, it has taken hold in the lower federal judiciary and is being applied in an ever-increasing number of cases.42
B. Expressed Justifications for the Privilege
The deliberative process privilege, like many other evidentiary
privileges, is a common law privilege.43 As such, it must be inter-

35. See id. at 944-45.
37. See id. at 945.
38. Id. at 945-46.
39. 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
40. See id. at 18. Justice Reed’s reliance upon this decision was misplaced, since he ignored
the role of the cabinet secretary’s quasijudicial deliberation in the Court’s analysis. See infra
notes 208-20 and accompanying text.
41. See Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 874-75.
42. See id. at 848. Although the Supreme Court has decided cases dealing with Exemption
5 of the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), which exempts from disclosure materials
which are “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available
by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5)
(1994), this statutory exemption from FOIA should not be considered congruent with the deliberative process privilege. See infra notes 127-40 and accompanying text.
43. See Wolfe v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 839 F.2d 768, 773 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (referring to the privilege as “[t]he common law discovery privilege”); 1 MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 108, at 427 (5th ed. 1999) (referring to the privilege as a common
law privilege); William K. Kelley, The Constitutional Dilemma of Litigation Under the Independent Counsel System, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1197, 1207 n.38 (1999) (referring to the “non-
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preted by the federal courts “in the light of reason and experience.”44
To facilitate interpretation, the courts have expressed four justifications for the deliberative process privilege—three based on policy
grounds and one based on constitutional principles. As with all privileges, the scope of the deliberative process privilege should not be extended beyond what is necessary to accomplish its underlying purposes.45 In light of this policy, courts have stated that “the
deliberative process privilege, like other executive privileges, should
be narrowly construed.”46
The first and most often cited rationale for the privilege is that
expressed by Justice Reed in Kaiser: the privilege “is intended to encourage the free flow of ideas and an uninhibited exchange of views
among government decisionmakers.”47 Therefore, disclosure of material created in furtherance of governmental deliberations is not in the
public interest because it could discourage the free and open exchange of information vital to effective and efficient policy formulation.48 Two additional policy justifications are often cited for the deconstitutional deliberative process privilege”); Weaver & Jones, supra note 5, at 289 & n.48
(citing decisions treating the privilege as derived from the common law, not the Constitution).
While there seems to be agreement that the privilege is based on common law, some argue that
the mental process branch (from Morgan) is based on constitutional principles. See 2 SCOTT N.
STONE & ROBERT K. TAYLOR, TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 9.08, at 9-17 (2d ed. 1993); 3 JACK
B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 509.21[3], at
509-16 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL
EVIDENCE]; Weaver & Jones, supra note 5, at 288-89. However, Morgan should not be viewed
as contributing to the rationale of the deliberative process privilege. See infra notes 208-20 and
accompanying text.
44. 10 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 501.01[2], at V-13 (2d ed.
1996).
45. See Gomez v. City of Nashua, 126 F.R.D. 432, 435 (D.N.H. 1989) (“The scope of the
privilege is limited by its underlying purpose and should not be applied where that purpose
would not be served.”).
46. Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army, 55 F.3d 827, 856 (3d Cir. 1995).
47. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, MODERN EVIDENCE 660
(1995); see also 2 STONE & TAYLOR, supra note 43, § 9.09, at 9-21 to 9-22 (observing that “effective and efficient governmental decision making depends on the free and uninhibited flow of
ideas”); 3 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 43, § 509.21, at 509-14 to 509-15 (asserting that the privilege is a balance between the competing interests of facilitating lawsuits
and the government’s need for confidentiality); 26A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, §
5680, at 131 (claiming that the privilege exists to ensure that there is no injury to the quality of
agency decisions) (citing MURL A. LARKIN, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 5.02, at 531 (1998)); Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 847 (arguing that disclosure “will chill future communications, thus diminishing the effectiveness of executive decisionmaking and injuring the public
interest”).
48. See Missouri v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 147 F.3d 708, 710 (8th Cir. 1998)
(“The purpose of the deliberative process privilege is to allow agencies freely to explore alter-
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liberative process privilege. One is that it protects against premature
disclosure of proposed policies before they have been fully considered or actually adopted by the agency.49 Thus, the privilege is designed to ensure that an agency is judged by the policies it actually
adopts, not those it merely considers.50 The second is that the privilege is said to prevent the public from confusing matters merely considered or discussed during the deliberative process with those on
which the decision was based.51 As discussed in Section III.B., these
two rationales more properly belong to Exemption 5 of the Freedom
of Information Act (“FOIA”), not the deliberative process privilege.
A final rationale is based on constitutional principles presented in
52
53
Morgan v. United States and its progeny. These cases aver that the
privilege protects the independence of the executive branch and preserves the separation of powers by preventing judicial probing into
the thought processes of executive officials.54

native avenues of action and to engage in internal debates without fear of public scrutiny.”);
Mead Data Cent. Inc. v. United States Dep’t of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 256 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (“[T]he quality of administrative decision-making would be seriously undermined if
agencies were forced to ‘operate in a fishbowl.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 89–813, at 9 (1965))).
49. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 47, at 660-61; 2 STONE & TAYLOR, supra
note 43, § 9.09, at 9-22.
50. See Jordan v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 773 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
51. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 47, at 661; 2 STONE & TAYLOR, supra note
43, § 9.09, at 9-22.
52. 298 U.S. 468 (1936).
53. See infra Section III.C.
54. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 47, at 661 (stating that “the privilege protects the independence of the executive branch by limiting the extent to which the judiciary is
allowed to probe the decisionmaking processes of executive officials”); 2 STONE & TAYLOR,
supra note 43, § 9.09, at 9-21 to 9-22 (observing that the judiciary does not have the authority to
probe the mental thoughts of executive officials); 3 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra
note 43, at 509-15 to 509-16 (stating that it is inappropriate for the judiciary to examine the
mental processes of an executive decisionmaker); Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 847-48 (arguing
that the policy is justified on sovereign immunity and separation of powers grounds, known as
the Morgan doctrine). This, however, is a misapplication of the Morgan doctrine and should
not be considered a justification for the deliberative process privilege. See infra notes 208-20
and accompanying text.
The determination of whether a privilege applies is made by the court. See FED. R. EVID.
104(a). Such a determination is generally made in camera. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 93
(1973); Hopkins v. United States Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., 929 F.2d 81, 85-86 (2d Cir.
1991); Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 473 F.2d 109, 114 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Hooker
Chems. & Plastics Corp., 114 F.R.D. 100, 103 (W.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Franklin Nat’l Bank Secs.
Litig., 478 F. Supp. 577, 582 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Weaver & Jones, supra note 5, at 310, 312-15.
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C. Substantive and Procedural Requirements of the Privilege
A proper invocation of the deliberative process privilege requires (1) that the party opposing discovery be the holder of the
privilege, and (2) that the information be privileged.55 Even when the
privilege is properly invoked, however, the inquiry is not at an end.
The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege,56 meaning
that it can be overcome upon sufficient showing of a need outweighing the grounds for confidentiality.57 Once the government has successfully invoked the privilege, the burden shifts to the party seeking
disclosure to show that its need outweighs the government’s interest
in confidentiality.58 Only after the party seeking discovery has demonstrated a particularized need59 for the privileged material will the
court balance opposing interests.60
1. Holder of the Privilege and Procedural Requirements. The
government is the holder of the deliberative process privilege, and
only the government may assert it.61 Although some courts permit a
litigation attorney or other government official to assert the
privilege,62 the generally accepted view is that the privilege must be
asserted by the head of the agency in question.63 The term “agency
head” has been interpreted to mean the top official at the
governmental agency.64 Moreover, the agency head has a
nondelegable duty to consider personally the documents in

55. See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 197 (3d ed. 1995).
56. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Texaco P.R., Inc. v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d 867, 885 (1st Cir. 1995); Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army, 55 F.3d 829, 854 (3d Cir. 1995); Franklin Nat’l Bank, 478 F. Supp. at
582.
57. See United States v. Farley, 11 F.3d 1385, 1389 (7th Cir. 1993) (“The deliberative process privilege may be overcome where there is a sufficient showing of a particularized need to
outweigh the reasons for confidentiality.”); Walker v. NCNB Nat’l Bank, 810 F. Supp. 11, 13
(D.D.C. 1993) (“In order to overcome the privilege, the party seeking disclosure must show
that the interests in disclosure outweigh the interests in non-disclosure.” (citing Bigelow v. District of Columbia, 122 F.R.D. 111, 113 (D.D.C. 1988))).
58. See Redland Soccer Club, 55 F.3d at 854 (“The party seeking discovery bears the burden of showing that its need for the documents outweighs the government’s interest.”); Ferrell
v. United States Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., 177 F.R.D. 425, 429 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (“Plaintiffs have the burden of showing that they have a particularized need for the documents.”).
59. See Farley, 11 F.3d at 1390 (holding that relevance alone is insufficient and that a particularized need must be shown).
60. This balancing is made on an ad hoc basis. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 737-38.
The matter is reviewed de novo on appeal. See Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1071 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
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question.65 This requirement is intended to promote “consistency and
prudence,” since the agency head will supposedly ensure that the
privilege is invoked in the best interest of the public and not merely
in the agency’s litigation interests.66 In addition to the duty of
personal inspection, an agency head must specifically identify and
describe the documents for which the privilege is sought.67 The
requirement that the agency head identify and describe documents is
usually accomplished by means of an affidavit.68
2. Substantive Requirements for Privilege. To demonstrate that
information is privileged, a party must show that (1) the information
is predecisional, (2) the information is deliberative, (3) the
government has maintained confidentiality, (4) the government has a
legitimate need for the information, and (5) the government would
be impaired in acquiring this type of information absent the

61. See First E. Corp. v. Mainwaring, 21 F.3d 465, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (emphasizing that
“only the government can assert its deliberative process privilege”); IMWINKELRIED, supra
note 55, at 197 (observing that “the government agency receiving the information is the
holder” of the privilege).
62. See Weaver & Jones, supra note 5, at 307-09.
63. See Ferrell, 177 F.R.D. at 428; Scott Paper Co. v. United States, 943 F. Supp. 489, 497
(E.D. Pa. 1996) [hereinafter Scott Paper I]; Wainwright v. Washington Metro. Area Transit
Auth., 163 F.R.D. 391, 396 (D.D.C. 1995); 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 110, at
438 (5th ed. 1999) (detailing requirements for asserting the privilege). This procedural requirement is identical to the requirement adopted by the Supreme Court for asserting the state
secrets privilege. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8-12 (1953) (adopting an executive
privilege protecting state secrets from disclosure and requiring that the privilege be asserted by
the agency head).
64. See Scott Paper I, 943 F. Supp. at 497. (“[W]hen courts refer to the ‘head of the agency
claiming the privilege’, they are referring to the top official.”).
65. See Ferrell, 177 F.R.D. at 428; Scott Paper Co. v. United States, 943 F. Supp. 501, 50203 (E.D. Pa. 1996) [hereinafter Scott Paper II]; Scott Paper I, 943 F. Supp. at 497; Wainwright,
163 F.R.D. at 396; see also Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 852-53. However, a litigation attorney
may claim the privilege when the evidence under consideration is testimonial evidence. See
Scott v. PPG Indus., 142 F.R.D. 291, 293-94 (N.D. W. Va. 1992) (“Even if the requirement that
the agency head consider allegedly privileged material and personally invoke the privilege
makes sense with regard to documents, it is ludicrous to suggest that the agency head rather
than the litigation attorney should be required to invoke the deliberative process privilege in a
deposition.”).
66. Piacenti, supra note 7, at 279.
67. See Ferrell, 177 F.R.D. at 428; Scott Paper II, 943 F. Supp. at 502; Scott Paper I, 943 F.
Supp. at 496-97; Wainwright, 163 F.R.D. at 396; Walker v. NCNB Nat’l Bank, 810 F. Supp 11,
13 (D.D.C. 1993); see also Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 852-53.
68. See Ferrell, 177 F.R.D. at 428. In addition to an affidavit, the court may require the
submission of a “Vaughn index.” See Weaver & Jones, supra note 5, at 300-12.
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protection of the privilege.69 The burden of demonstrating these
elements rests upon the government agency resisting disclosure.70
a. Predecisional. To demonstrate that information is exempt
from disclosure under the deliberative process privilege, the party
resisting disclosure must first show that the material is
“predecisional.”71 While predecisional materials may be exempt from
disclosure under the privilege, “postdecisional” materials are not.72
Although the term implies that materials must be chronologically
predecisional, chronology alone is insufficient. Even if material
predates a final agency action, it does not satisfy the predecisional
prong if the material did not contribute to that decision.73 Materials
are predecisional if they are “designed to assist agency
decisionmakers in arriving at their decisions” and contain “the
personal opinions of the writer rather than the policy of the
agency.”74 Documents prepared by officials who lack the authority to
take final agency action have been found to be necessarily
predecisional.75
A final decision does not automatically waive the privilege for
deliberative documents that contributed to a decision.76 Nor is it al-

69. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 55, at 197-98 (asserting that to establish a prima facie
case for invoking the privilege the government must establish the five aforementioned elements).
70. See Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Redland Soccer Club, Inc.
v. Department of the Army, 55 F.3d 829, 854 (3d Cir. 1995); Becker v. IRS, 34 F.3d 398, 403
(7th Cir. 1994); City of Virginia Beach v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 995 F.2d 1247,
1253 (4th Cir. 1993); Hopkins v. United States Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., 929 F.2d 81, 85
(2d Cir. 1991).
71. See Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng’g Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 184 (1975);
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151-52 (1975); Tax Analysts, 117 F.3d at 616;
Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1997); A.
Michael’s Piano, Inc. v. FTC, 18 F.3d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 1994); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 1241,
1248 (4th Cir. 1994); Town of Norfolk v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 968 F.2d 1438,
1458 (1st Cir. 1992); Florida House of Representatives v. United States Dep’t of Commerce,
961 F.2d 941, 945 (11th Cir. 1992).
72. See Sears, 421 U.S. at 151-52; Redland Soccer Club, 55 F.3d at 854; Assembly of Cal. v.
United States Dep’t of Commerce, 968 F.2d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 1992).
73. See Assembly of Cal., 968 F.2d at 921.
74. Missouri v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 147 F.3d 708, 710 (8th Cir. 1998); accord Maricopa Audubon Soc’y, 108 F.3d at 1093; City of Virginia Beach v. United States Dep’t
of Commerce, 995 F.2d 1247, 1253 (4th Cir. 1993); Assembly of Cal., 968 F.2d at 920; Florida
House, 961 F.2d at 945; Hopkins, 929 F.2d at 84.
75. See A. Michael’s Piano, 18 F.3d at 147; Hopkins, 929 F.2d at 85.
76. See Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 473 F.2d 109, 115 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Manna v. United
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ways necessary that a specific final decision be identified—the party
resisting disclosure must simply show that the materials are part of
the deliberative process generally.77 The government is not required
to identify a specific deliberation. Since agencies are continually reexamining their actions and policies, material that is deemed deliberative may qualify for exemption even in the absence of a specific
deliberative process.78
b. Deliberative. Predecisional documents are not exempt
merely because of their predecisional status. The materials must also
be “deliberative,” meaning that they are a part of the give-and-take
process by which decisions are made and policy is formulated.79
Courts have developed a number of different tests to determine
whether materials are deliberative. Some courts look to see if the
material was in fact related to the process through which decisions
are typically made.80 Another approach focuses on whether the
disclosure of the materials in question would expose the
government’s decisionmaking processes in such a way that the free
flow of information would be chilled and the agency’s ability to
perform its functions effectively would be undermined.81 Other courts
require that the materials be a direct part of the agency’s deliberative
States Dep’t of Justice, 815 F. Supp. 798, 815 (D.N.J. 1993).
77. See City of Virginia Beach, 995 F.2d at 1255; Hunt v. U.S. Marine Corps, 935 F. Supp.
46, 51 (D.D.C. 1996). Although the identification of a specific final decision is not required, the
absence of a final decision may weaken or be fatal to a privilege claim. See Vaughn v. Rosen,
523 F.2d 1136, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1975). But see Senate of P.R. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 823 F.2d
574, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (requiring that the agency pinpoint the decision to which the documents contributed).
78. See Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng’g Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 184 (1975);
NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151 n.18 (1975).
79. See Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Maricopa Audubon Soc’y,
108 F.3d at 1093; City of Virginia Beach, 995 F.2d at 1253; Assembly of Cal., 968 F.2d at 920;
Florida House, 961 F.2d at 945; Hopkins, 929 F.2d at 84-85.
80. See, e.g., Hopkins, 929 F.2d at 84-85 (“[T]he privilege focus[es] on documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by
which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.” (alterations in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
81. See, e.g., Missouri v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 147 F.3d 708, 710 (8th Cir.
1998) (“A document is deliberative if its disclosure would expose the agency’s decisionmaking
process in a way that would discourage candid discussion and thus undermine the agency’s
ability to perform its functions.”); Maricopa Audubon Soc’y, 108 F.3d at 1093 (“A predecisional document is part of the deliberative process, if the disclosure of [the] materials would
expose an agency’s decisionmaking process in such a way as to discourage candid discussion
within the agency and thereby undermine the agency’s ability to perform its functions.” (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted)).
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processes in that they express opinions or make recommendations on
matters of policy.82 Another approach focuses only on whether “the
information reflect[s] the give-and-take of the consultative process.”83
Opinions expressed by individuals who are not a part of the
deliberative process are not protected by the privilege.84 The privilege
also does not protect materials that are only peripheral to the
decisionmaking process.85 Thus, summaries of past decisions and
investigations regarding past agency actions are not exempt from
disclosure under the privilege.86 Some courts, however, have held that
materials created outside of the decisionmaking process, the release
of which would expose that process or the substance of deliberations
within the process, may be protected by the privilege.87 In order to
determine whether materials in question are deliberative, courts
require that the government provide sufficient information about its
deliberative process to establish that the materials actually are a part
of that process.88
c. Maintaining confidentiality. This element of the analysis
focuses on whether the government’s protection of the information in
question has been sufficient to preserve confidentiality, or whether
the privilege has been effectively waived. Courts have generally
taken a lenient view with respect to the government’s position. While
clear or explicit incorporation of deliberative material into an
agency’s final policy will place the material outside the privilege’s

82. See, e.g., Town of Norfolk v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 968 F.2d 1438, 1458
(1st Cir. 1992) (defining a deliberative document as one that “makes recommendations or expresses opinions on legal or policy matters”).
83. Florida House, 961 F.2d at 949.
84. See 26A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5680, at 146 (“[T]he privilege does not
apply to those whose opinions don’t count . . . .”).
85. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 1241, 1248 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he privilege does not
protect a document which is merely peripheral to actual policy formation; the record must bear
on the formulation or exercise of policy-oriented judgment.”).
86. See J.R. Norton Co. v. Arizmendi, 108 F.R.D. 647, 649 (S.D. Cal. 1985) (“Summaries
or commentaries on past administrative determinations or investigations of past agency acts are
not protected.”).
87. See Weinstein v. United States Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 977 F. Supp. 41, 45
(D.D.C. 1997) (“[T]he deliberative process privilege protect[s] a document created outside the
deliberative process whose release would reveal the substance of the comments made within
that process.”).
88. See Lurie v. Department of the Army, 970 F. Supp. 19, 33 (D.D.C. 1997) (holding that
a government agency must provide sufficient information about its decisionmaking process to
show that the materials sought to be withheld actually are a part of that process).
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protection,89 incorporation that is less than clear or explicit will not.90
Prior disclosures need not result in automatic waiver of the
privilege.91 Rather, the fact that material has been disclosed simply
becomes a factor in the waiver analysis.92 Likewise, the release of
similar or related material does not suffice to waive the privilege—
the party seeking disclosure must show that the specific facts in
question have entered the public domain.93 The privilege is also not
waived through inadvertent disclosure of the deliberative material.94
Moreover, prior involuntary disclosure may not result in waiver of
the privilege.95 At least one court has held that an individual agency
employee’s comments reiterating her own recommendations or
opinions expressed during the deliberative process cannot waive the
government’s right to assert the privilege with regard to that

89. This is because agencies will not be permitted to develop a body of “secret law” by
hiding final policy decisions behind the shield of the deliberative process privilege. See Tax
Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
90. See Florida House of Representatives v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 961 F.2d
941, 945 n.4 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that only material expressly adopted is discoverable);
North Dartmouth Properties, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Housing and Urban Dev., 984 F.
Supp. 65, 69 (D. Mass. 1997) (“A ‘pre-decisional’ document can lose its protection, but only if
an agency expressly chooses to adopt it or incorporates it by reference in announcing its decision.”); United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 402 F. Supp. 796, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (“[W]here it
is clear that an agency has adopted material in an otherwise exempt document as the basis of a
non-exempt decision, some courts have held that the adopted material loses its immune
status.”). Mere agreement between final decision and deliberative materials is insufficient to
warrant disclosure. See Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng’g Corp., 421 U.S. 168,
184-85 (1975); Skelton v. United States Postal Serv., 678 F.2d 35, 41 (5th Cir. 1982).
91. See Assembly of Cal. v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 968 F.2d 916, 923 n.5 (9th
Cir. 1992) (“Agencies should not be penalized for openness. We consider prior disclosures only
to determine whether the disclosure of these tapes would expose the decision-making process
any more than it has already been disclosed.”). But see Melendez-Colon v. United States, No.
Civ. 97-2192(JP), 1999 WL 388207, at *3 (D.P.R. May 25, 1999) (holding that prior disclosure
to insurance adjusters constituted waiver of the privilege).
92. See Assembly of Cal., 968 F.2d at 923 n.5.
93. See Public Citizen v. Department of State, 11 F.3d 198, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(“[A]lthough an agency bears the burden of proving that a FOIA exemption applies to a given
document, a plaintiff asserting that information has been previously disclosed bears the initial
burden of pointing to specific information in the public domain that duplicates that being withheld.”).
94. See Scott v. PPG Industries, 142 F.R.D. 291, 294 (N.D. W. Va. 1992) (holding that inadvertent FOIA disclosure, where agency policy required that documents not be disclosed,
does not constitute waiver of the deliberative process privilege).
95. See Florida House, 961 F.2d at 946 (stating that materials involuntarily disclosed by
means other than FOIA would not result in a waiver of rights of confidentiality under FOIA
Exemption 5). Presumably, however, previous FOIA disclosure of the specific information
would be fatal to subsequent efforts to protect that information under FOIA.
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information.96 With respect to interagency communications,
disclosure of confidential documents by one government agency to
another does not waive the privilege.97 Additionally, one government
agency cannot waive the privilege protecting materials that reflect
the decisionmaking process of another agency.98
d. Legitimate need for information. No cases have refined the
meaning of this requirement.99 It appears that courts assume that
government agencies have a legitimate need for any predecisional,
deliberative materials that are a part of an agency’s decisionmaking
process. The basis for this assumption, however, is unclear.
e. Denial of the privilege would impair the free flow of
information. This last requirement for establishing a prima facie case
for invoking the privilege derives from the justifications for the

96. See North Dartmouth Properties, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Hous. and Urban
Dev., 984 F. Supp. 65, 68 (D. Mass. 1997) (stating that such comments must be protected to
“avoid revealing the ingredients of the decision-making process” (internal quotations omitted)). Presumably such disclosure is considered inadvertent on the part of the government,
even though the disclosure is intentional on the part of the employee. The privilege is held by
the government, and only the government can waive it. See supra note 61 and accompanying
text.
97. See FTC v. Digital Interactive Assocs., Inc., No. 95-Z-754, 1997 WL 524905, at *3 (D.
Colo. Mar. 17, 1997).
98. See id. (holding that the FTC could not waive the FCC’s privilege).
99. Despite the fact that Professor Imwinkelried identifies this element as necessary for a
prima facie case for asserting the privilege, see IMWINKELRIED, supra note 55, at 197, courts
generally seem to skip this step of the analysis and to move directly to step five.
The requirement that the government demonstrate a legitimate need for the information
in question illustrates the relative importance of the four stated justifications for the privilege.
See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text. Of the four rationales, this requirement is related
only to the rationale encouraging the free flow of ideas within agency deliberations. The dangers associated with disclosure of proposed policies before they have been considered or
adopted, and the dangers associated with public confusion regarding the true basis for agency
decisions, likely are not reduced when the government does not have a legitimate need for the
information. Presumably, these dangers are increased. For example, if an agency does not, in
fact, have a legitimate need for certain information, the probability that the information will be
considered, processed, and acted upon is diminished. The agency, therefore, may be exposed to
an increased risk that it will be judged on the basis of matters other than its actual decisions.
This would also increase the risk of public confusion. If the public is confused by disclosure of
materials not actually affecting the final decision, the release of additional materials unrelated
to a final decision, and accorded even less protection than other deliberative materials, would
seem to present a greater risk of confusion. Finally, this requirement does not bear any relation
to the Morgan doctrine, discussed infra at notes 208-20 and accompanying text. Judicial intrusion into the mental processes of executive officials is still intrusion, regardless of whether the
executive can demonstrate a legitimate need for materials relating to those mental processes.
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privilege itself: “A ruling that the privilege applies ‘should . . . rest
fundamentally on the conclusion that, unless protected from public
disclosure, information of that type would not flow freely within the
agency.’”100 The government bears the burden of showing that the
disclosure of information “‘would actually inhibit candor in the
decision-making process if made available to the public.’”101 This
requirement clearly reflects the underlying rationale of the privilege
that the flow of information should be unhindered.102
3. Exceptions to the Privilege. As with other qualified privileges,
the deliberative process privilege is subject to exceptions. As
mentioned above, the privilege protects materials involved in the
deliberative process but does not protect final decisions made by
governmental agencies.103 Courts will not allow agencies to develop a
body of “secret law” by protecting final decisions from disclosure
under the deliberative process privilege.104 The privilege is also
unavailable when the decisionmaking process itself is the subject of
litigation.105 Courts will also not allow the government to invoke the
privilege in cases in which the purpose of disclosure is to expose
government malfeasance.106
4. Balancing of Interests. Although the deliberative process
privilege is a qualified privilege107 and may, as such, be overcome by a
100. Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Mead Data Cent.,
Inc. v. Department of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
101. Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Department of the Air Force, 44 F. Supp. 2d 295, 300
(D.D.C. 1999) (quoting Army Times Publ’g Co. v. Department of the Air Force, 998 F.2d 1067,
1072 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
102. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
104. See Tax Analysts, 117 F.3d at 617. A body of “secret law” is an undisclosed collection
of orders, interpretations, rules, etc., with precedential value that the agency actually applies to
cases before it. See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 867-68
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussing “secret law”).
105. See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 145 F.3d 1422, 1424 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that
when a cause of action turns on the government’s intent, the deliberative process privilege does
not apply); Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 110 F.R.D. 660, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that where the process itself is the issue, the information relating to that process must be
disclosed).
106. See In re Subpoena, 145 F.3d at 1424 (“If Congress creates a cause of action that deliberatively exposes government decisionmaking to the light, the privilege’s raison d’être evaporates.”); Texaco P.R., Inc. v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d 867, 885 (1st Cir. 1995)
(rejecting the assertion of the privilege where government malfeasance was involved).
107. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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sufficient showing of need,108 courts rarely override the privilege.109
Nevertheless, the courts have determined that the policy
justifications for the privilege warrant only a qualified privilege,110
and then only when the requirements enumerated in Section II.B are
satisfied. Consequently, such a de facto transformation of the
privilege into a quasi-absolute privilege is unjustified. The courts
have identified a number of factors that establish a workable
standard for balancing the interests of the government in resisting
disclosure against the interests of litigants in gaining access to
information.111
One factor is the identity of the author of the deliberative materials, as well as the position of that individual and the recipient of the
materials within the deliberative hierarchy.112 The greatest protection
should be granted to communications between the ultimate decisionmakers within a governmental agency.113 Following this reasoning, where communications involve individuals closer to the bottom
of the deliberative hierarchy, the materials should be given less protection. A closely related factor is the possibility of future timidity of
government agency employees caused by the realization that deliberative materials may be violable.114 As discussed in Section II.B.5,
this factor is actually an element of a prima facie assertion of the
privilege.

108. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
109. See Piacenti, supra note 7, at 289; Weaver & Jones, supra note 5, at 319. Most cases in
which courts finds sufficient need to override the privilege involve government malfeasance or
failure to satisfy procedural requirements, although even these cases do not always trigger rejection. See Piacenti, supra note 7, at 289-90.
110. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Texaco P.R., 60 F.3d at
885; Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army, 55 F.3d 827, 854 (3d Cir. 1995);
United States v. Farley, 11 F.3d 1385, 1389-90 (7th Cir. 1993); In re Franklin Nat’l Bank Sec.
Litig., 478 F. Supp. 577, 582 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
111. The factors that follow are not presented in any particular order. The factors applied
and the weight assigned to each will vary from case to case. See United States Postal Serv. v.
Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
112. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 1241, 1249 (4th Cir. 1994); Senate of P.R. v. United
States Dep’t of Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Department of the Air Force, 44 F. Supp. 2d 295, 300 (D.D.C. 1999).
113. See United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 402 F. Supp. 796, 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (noting
that “nowhere is [the] protection [of nondisclosure] more needed than between the ultimate
decision-makers within an agency” (alterations in original)).
114. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 737-38; Redland Soccer Club, 55 F.3d at 854; Phelps
Dodge, 852 F. Supp. at 165.
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Additional factors include the relevance of the evidence
sought,115 the availability of other similar evidence,116 the importance
of the information to a litigant’s case,117 the seriousness of litigation
and the issues involved,118 the government’s role in the litigation,119
the strength of a litigant’s case,120 and the interests of the litigants.121
In addition to the interests of the participating litigants, the court
should also consider a number of societal interests: society’s interest
in accurate factfinding,122 the public’s interest in securing honest, effective government,123 and the federal government’s interest in the enforcement of federal law.124 Finally, courts may consider the availability and effectiveness of protective measures.125
5. FOIA Exemption 5. When considering the balancing of interests under the deliberative process privilege, one must be careful to
consider the interplay between the privilege and Exemption 5 of
FOIA.126 Exemption 5 provides that FOIA does not require disclo-

115. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 737-38; Redland Soccer Club, 55 F.3d at 854; Phelps
Dodge, 852 F. Supp. at 165.
116. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 737-38; Redland Soccer Club, 55 F.3d at 854; Phelps
Dodge, 852 F. Supp. at 165.
117. See Phelps Dodge, 852 F. Supp. at 165.
118. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 737-38; Redland Soccer Club, 55 F.3d at 854; Phelps
Dodge, 852 F. Supp. at 165.
119. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 737-38; Redland Soccer Club, 55 F.3d at 854; Phelps
Dodge, 852 F. Supp. at 165. When the government is the defendant or a third party, this factor
should favor exemption of deliberative materials from disclosure. See 1 MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 109 (5th ed. 1999) (discussing the effects of the government’s presence as either a third party or a defendant); Piacenti, supra note 7, at 277 (“Generally the
privilege is held applicable when the agency is a defendant or third party . . . .” (footnote omitted)). However, when the government agency is the plaintiff or prosecutor, disclosure should
be favored. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 109 (5th ed. 1999) (arguing that
when the government is the plaintiff or prosecutor, generally either the information should be
disclosed or the action dismissed); Piacenti, supra note 7, at 277 (citing cases which hold that
the privilege is generally not held applicable when the government is the prosecutor or plaintiff).
120. See Phelps Dodge, 852 F. Supp. at 165.
121. See Texaco P.R., Inc. v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d 867, 885 (1st Cir.
1995). Any relevant interests should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. See Phelps Dodge,
852 F. Supp. at 165.
122. See Texaco P.R., 60 F.3d at 885.
123. See id.
124. See Piacenti, supra note 7, at 283.
125. See 3 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 43, §509.22[3], at 509-21.
126. This interplay is also discussed in 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 108, at
428-30 (5th ed. 1999). For an extended treatment of FOIA Exemption 5, see United States
Dep’t of Justice, Freedom of Information Guide (last modified Sept. 1998)
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sure of materials that are “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other
than an agency in litigation with the agency.”127 Exemption 5 incorporates the deliberative process privilege,128 in addition to other privileges that the government enjoys.129 Since courts rarely distinguish
clearly between the common law deliberative process privilege and
the privilege under FOIA, FOIA cases provide valuable guidance in
establishing the boundaries of the privilege.130
The underlying rationale of Exemption 5 is essentially the same
as the justifications for the deliberative process privilege. Exemption
5 is intended to protect the free flow of information within an agency,
to ensure that agency officials are judged by what they actually decide as opposed to what they merely consider, and to protect against
the public confusion that would result from premature disclosure of
deliberative material.131 While there are similarities between FOIA
Exemption 5 and the deliberative process privilege analyses132—and
in many instances, the two can be treated as essentially the same133—a
fundamental difference must be considered when analyzing claims
arising under the privilege.
FOIA does not address the question of admissibility of evidence,134 and therefore Exemption 5 should not be considered a con<http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/exemption5.htm#exemption> (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
127. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1994).
128. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86-88 (1973); Grand Cent. Partnership, Inc. v. Cuomo,
166 F.3d 473, 481 (2d Cir. 1999); Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. United States Forest Serv., 108
F.3d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1997); Mapother v. Department of Justice, 3 F.3d 1533, 1537 (D.C.
Cir. 1993); Florida House of Representatives v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 961 F.2d
941, 944-45 (11th Cir. 1992); Hopkins v. United States Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., 929
F.2d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 1991).
129. See Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng’g Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 184 (1975)
(“Exemption 5 incorporates the privileges which the Government enjoys under the relevant
statutory and case law in the pretrial discovery context . . . .”).
130. See 2 STONE & TAYLOR, supra note 43, § 9.10, at 9-24.
131. See Cuomo, 166 F.3d at 481 (articulating the policies behind Exemption 5); Mead Data
Cent., Inc. v. United States Dep’t of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (same).
132. For example, courts have stated that Exemption 5 is also to be narrowly construed. See
Maricopa Audubon Soc’y, 108 F.3d at 1093; Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 1241, 1248 (4th Cir.
1994); Mapother, 3 F.3d at 1537; Florida House, 961 F.2d at 944. It does not apply to final
opinions, see NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 148 (1975), does not protect the
adopted decisions and policies of governmental agencies, see id. at 151-52, and does not protect
segregable facts, see Ethyl Corp., 25 F.3d at 1250.
133. See 2 STONE & TAYLOR, supra note 43, § 9.10, at 9-24.
134. See Sears, 421 U.S. at 143 n.10 (describing FOIA as “fundamentally designed to inform
the public about agency action and not to benefit private litigants”).
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gressional enactment of the deliberative process privilege,135 even
though it may incorporate the rationale of the privilege. FOIA protects materials subject to “routine disclosure” by the government.136
Any material that is protected by a privilege, whether absolute or
qualified, is clearly not subject to routine disclosure under FOIA.137
In other words, once the government makes a prima facie showing
for invoking the privilege, analysis under FOIA Exemption 5 stops
and does not proceed to the balancing of interests. This is an important distinction between the deliberative process privilege and FOIA.
While a litigant’s need for information may be sufficient to override
the privilege, such need would not remove that information from the
category of material that is normally privileged.138 Therefore, while
FOIA may properly be viewed as defining the maximum limits of the
privilege,139 the privilege itself should be interpreted as being somewhat less protective than Exemption 5.140
135. See John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 153 (1989) (“[T]he FOIA was
not intended to supplement or displace rules of discovery.”); Association for Women in Science
v. Califano, 566 F.2d 339, 342 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“FOIA neither expands nor contracts existing
privileges, nor does it create any new privileges.”); 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2,
§ 108, at 429 (5th ed. 1999) (“FOIA itself does not address the question of evidentiary admissibility, and thus cannot be said to be a statutory enactment of the privileges in question.”).
136. FTC v. Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 27 (1983).
137. See id.
138. See id. at 28 (“It is not difficult to imagine litigation in which one party’s need for otherwise privileged documents would be sufficient to override the privilege but that does not remove the documents from the category of the normally privileged.”); 26A WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5680, at 130:
One reason why the deliberative process privilege will never be congruent with the
exemption is that the privilege is only a qualified one, that is, in deciding whether to
uphold a claim of the privilege, the court must balance the government’s claimed
need for secrecy against the court’s own need for evidence to resolve a dispute before it.
(footnote omitted).
139. See MURL A. LARKIN, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 5.01, at 5-8 n.17 (1998)
(“Availability under FOIA should always defeat a claim of privilege.”); 1 MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 108, at 429 (5th ed. 1999) (“[I]t is obvious that [the privilege and
FOIA] are critically interrelated and that the exemption provisions mark the outermost limits
of the privileges. It would be anomalous in the extreme to deny evidentiary admission on
grounds of confidentiality to material available on request to even the casually interested.”).
140. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 108, at 430 n.17 (5th ed. 1999)
(quoting Hearings on Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence Before the Subcomm. on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 274 (1973) (testimony
of Friendly, J.)):
The problems of what a citizen should be able to get from a Government agency
when he has simply the general interest of the citizen in finding out what is going on
and the problems of the litigant who has a particular need are obviously very differ-
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II. PROTECTIONS ACCORDED FACTUAL INFORMATION BY THE
COURTS
Purely factual information that is severable from deliberative
opinions is not protected under the deliberative process privilege or
FOIA Exemption 5.141 The line between severable and non-severable
facts becomes somewhat blurred, however, when facts are a more integral part of the deliberative process. The treatment of such factual
material under the deliberative process privilege and FOIA Exemption 5 has been inconsistent.
In Soucie v. David,142 the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit found that factual information is subject
to Exemption 5 protection “only if it is inextricably intertwined with
policy-making processes.”143 As an example, the court noted that factual materials prepared in response to specific questions by a government official may be protected since they would expose the official’s deliberative processes to unnecessary public scrutiny.144 The
court also warned, however, that “courts must beware of ‘the inevitable temptation of a government litigant to give [this exemption] an
expansive interpretation in relation to the particular records in issue.’”145
The federal courts have wrestled with how to apply the deliberative process privilege to factual information gathered by lower-level
government employees, particularly when the information is not in
response to a specific question from a higher-level official. In Florida
146
House of Representatives v. United States Department of Commerce,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected
a FOIA disclosure request for adjusted block-level census data. The
court expressly held that, once material is determined to be delibera-

ent and almost by hypothesis what is the right solution for the first can not be the
right solution for the second.
141. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87-88 (1973); Grand Cent. Partnership, Inc. v. Cuomo,
166 F.3d 473, 481 (2d Cir. 1999); Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Department of the Army, 55
F.3d 827, 854 (3d Cir. 1995); City of Virginia Beach v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 995
F.2d 1247, 1253 (4th Cir. 1993); Town of Norfolk v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 968
F.2d 1438, 1458 (1st Cir. 1992); Skelton v. United States Postal Serv., 678 F.2d 35, 38 (5th Cir.
1982); Playboy Enter. v. Department of Justice, 677 F.2d 931, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
142. 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
143. Id. at 1078.
144. See id.
145. Id. (quoting Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
146. 961 F.2d 941 (11th Cir. 1992).
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tive, any additional analysis is inappropriate.147 Therefore, the court
recognized a single test for determining whether facts should be protected by the privilege or FOIA: “Does the information reflect the
give-and-take of the consultive [sic] process”?148 If this question is answered in the affirmative, then the material is privileged.149 This
analysis failed to address the final element required to establish a
prima facie case for invoking the privilege: whether the government
would be impaired in acquiring this type of information if it were not
exempt from disclosure.150
The same year the Eleventh Circuit decided Florida House, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided Assem151
bly of California v. United States Department of Commerce. As in
Florida House, the California state assembly sought FOIA disclosure
of statistically adjusted census figures. The court ruled that the Department of Commerce had already exposed so much of its deliberative process that there was no purpose in its continued protection.152
In the process, the Ninth Circuit reasserted its approval of the “functional test,”153 rather than the “fact/opinion distinction” applied in
154
Florida House. The Ninth Circuit stated that the distinction between fact and opinion is simply a “useful rule-of-thumb favoring disclosure of factual documents, or the factual portions of deliberative
documents where such a separation is feasible.”155 Applying the functional test, the court focused on whether “revealing the information
exposes the deliberative process” of the government agency.156 The
court assumed that any materials which might expose the deliberative
process were protected by the privilege.157 The functional test applied
by the Ninth Circuit ignored the issue of whether disclosure of the information would chill future deliberations or hinder the government
in acquiring this type of information.

147. See id. at 949.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
151. 968 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1992).
152. See id. at 923.
153. The functional test was enunciated in National Wildlife Federation v. United States
Forest Service, 861 F.2d 1114, 1118-19 (9th Cir. 1988).
154. See Assembly of Cal., 968 F.2d at 921-22 & n.3.
155. Id. at 921.
156. Id.
157. See id.
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Also in 1992, then-Judge Ginsburg, writing for a majority of the
D.C. Circuit, approved a FOIA disclosure request for a legal landdescription file from the Bureau of Land Management.158 In the
course of her analysis, Judge Ginsburg noted that the “fact/opinion
distinction . . . is not always dispositive” and that the “key question”
in these cases is “whether disclosure would tend to diminish candor
within an agency.”159 Thus, unlike her colleagues in the Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits, Judge Ginsburg included an analysis of whether
disclosure would impair future governmental deliberations. However,
since the requested information in Petroleum Information was publicly available from other sources at the time of trial, the D.C. Circuit
did not provide much guidance as to when disclosure of information
would chill future deliberations.
The Petroleum Information test was refined a year later by the
D.C. Circuit in Mapother v. Department of Justice.160 Mapother concerned a report prepared by lower-level officials at the Department
of Justice to assist the Attorney General in determining whether to
deny entry of a foreign official into the United States.161 The information was not compiled in response to specific questions, but was
rather gathered to accomplish two objectives: “to provide the Attorney General with the information on which to decide whether [the
official] should be excluded from the United States, and to provide
the means for defending a decision to exclude him against legal challenge.”162 The court explained that the key to the deliberative process
analysis is the relationship between the factual information and the
decisionmaking process of the agency.163 The court determined that
the factual summaries were privileged because they would assist a
higher-level official in making a policy decision.164 In effect, the court
held that the factual information was privileged because of the possible effect disclosure would have on the higher-level official.165
158. See Petroleum Info. Corp. v. United States Dep’t of the Interior, 976 F.2d 1429, 1439
(D.C. Cir. 1992).
159. Id. at 1434-35.
160. 3 F.3d 1533 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
161. See id. at 1536.
162. Id.
163. See id. at 1539.
164. See id.
165. Recently, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia resorted to an
earlier test to determine the applicability of the deliberative process privilege. Relying on a test
formulated in 1987, the court stated:
[T]he ultimate question in deciding whether the deliberative process privilege applies
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF PROTECTING
FACTUAL INFORMATION FROM DISCLOSURE
The purpose of testimonial privileges is to foster candor in relationships that courts deem important.166 Additional justifications for
the existence of privileges include the necessity of protecting privacy
and freedom in important relationships, as well as facilitating trust
and honor.167 Privileges, however, are rights that require justification
because they “are not designed to enhance the reliability of the factfinding process,” and, in fact, “impede the search for truth.”168 They
impose serious costs to litigants and should be rare exceptions to the
disclosure of evidence, not a general rule.169
In United States v. Nixon,170 Chief Justice Burger, writing for a
unanimous Court, explained why courts must interpret privileges
with caution. Acknowledging that privileges “are in derogation of the
search for truth,”171 he cautioned that “[t]he need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive.”172 The ends of justice, he wrote, “would be defeated if
judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public
confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts,
within the framework of the rules of evidence.”173 Accordingly, limitations on discovery “‘are properly placed upon the operation of this
general principle only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational

is not whether the material is “factual” or not. . . . Instead, the critical question is
whether “disclosure of the materials would expose an agency’s decision-making process in such a way as to discourage candid discussion within the agency and thereby
undermine the agency’s ability to perform its functions.”
Chemical Weapons Working Group v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 185 F.R.D. 1, 3
(D.D.C. 1999) (mem.) (quoting Dudman Communications v. Department of the Air Force, 815
F.2d 1565, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). In making this decision, the court looked to the underlying
policies of the privilege to determine whether disclosure of the information would conflict with
these policies. See id.
166. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 47, at 428.
167. See id. at 429-30.
168. Id. at 427.
169. See Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 883.
170. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
171. Id. at 710.
172. Id. at 709.
173. Id.
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means for ascertaining truth.’”174 Therefore, a party seeking to assert
an established privilege bears the heavy burden of demonstrating that
exclusion of evidence is warranted.
Additionally, courts should be cautious when analyzing assertions of governmental agencies. Bureaucratic entities naturally try to
avoid disclosure to increase their power and to further their own interests.175 Thus, in light of governmental self-interest, courts should be
hesitant to accept governmental claims of the necessity of secrecy in a
given situation. To strike the proper balance between the interests of
the government litigant and the interests of the judiciary in promoting the search for truth, governmental privileges should be construed
as narrowly as possible.176 Consequently, the deliberative process
privilege should not be extended beyond what is necessary to accomplish its underlying purposes.177
A. Chilling of the Free and Open Flow of Information
The primary rationale for the deliberative process privilege is
that the privilege prevents the chilling of the free flow of information
within the deliberative process that would occur if the information
were subject to disclosure.178 This argument has been criticized as unsubstantiated.179 In United States v. Nixon, the Supreme Court con174. Id. at 710 n.18 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting)).
175. See Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 885. Max Weber writes:
Every bureaucracy seeks to increase the superiority of the professionally informed
by keeping their knowledge and intentions secret. Bureaucratic administration always tends to be an administration of “secret sessions”: in so far as it can it hides its
knowledge and action from criticism . . . . The tendency toward secrecy in certain
administrative fields follows their material nature: everywhere that the power interests of the domination structure toward the outside are at stake . . . we find secrecy.
MAX WEBER, Bureaucracy, reprinted in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196, 233
(H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946); see also Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 885
n.161.
176. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710 (declaring that privileges are not “lightly created or expansively construed”); see also supra notes 45-46 (citing cases stating that the deliberative process
privilege is to be narrowly construed).
177. See Gomez v. City of Nashua, 126 F.R.D. 432, 435 (D.N.H. 1989) (“The scope of the
privilege is limited by its underlying purpose and should not be applied where that purpose
would not be served.”).
178. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
179. See, e.g., 26A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5680, at 131 (referring to this instrumental rationale as “puny”); Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 887-88 (arguing that it is not clear
that this rationale actually underlies the nondisclosure decisions).
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cluded that this rationale was probably not sound: “[W]e cannot conclude that advisers will be moved to temper the candor of their remarks by the infrequent occasions of disclosure because of the possibility that such conversations will be called for in the context of a
criminal prosecution.”180 The British House of Lords also reversed its
earlier decisions recognizing the privilege, concluding that the chilling rationale was implausible.181 The courts, however, have generally
opted to follow the nonbinding precedent of the Court of Claims,
while ignoring the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Nixon. Courts do
not generally engage in any significant analysis of whether this danger is likely to occur.182
Little, if any, empirical evidence exists to support the claim that
such chilling actually occurs.183 Indeed, there appears to have been little attempt even to determine the impact of disclosure on government officials in those cases in which the courts have refused to apply
the privilege.184 Instead, courts seem to base their analysis on
“hunches and intuition,”185 “parrot[ing] the harms suggested by Justice Reed in Kaiser,” rather than analyzing the possible chilling effect
of disclosure on the free flow of information.186 The accumulated empirical evidence of the effect of privileges does not support the
proposition that a relatively low risk of disclosure chills open communication. The evidence indicates that such chilling may occur

180. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 712. The Court cited an earlier opinion concerning the potential of
chilling the deliberations of a petit jury in criminal proceedings. The Court stated:
“A juror of integrity and reasonable firmness will not fear to speak his mind if the
confidences of debate are barred to the ears of mere impertinence or malice. He will
not expect to be shielded against the disclosure of his conduct in the event that there
is evidence reflecting upon his honor. The chance that now and then there may be
found some timid soul who will take counsel of his fears and give way to their repressive power is too remote and shadowy to shape the course of justice.”
Id. at 712 n.20 (quoting Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 16 (1933)). Additionally, at least one
state supreme court has refused to adopt the privilege rationale. See District Att’y v. Flatley,
646 N.E.2d 127, 129 (Mass. 1995).
181. See supra note 23.
182. See 3 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 43, § 509.21[1], at 509-14; Weaver
& Jones, supra note 5, at 315-16 (“Most courts engage in only the most perfunctory analysis.”).
183. See Weaver & Jones, supra note 5, at 316 (noting the absence of any such study);
Wetlaufer, surpa note 2, at 886-87 (noting the absence of empirical evidence, as well as even a
single specific and verifiable anecdote).
184. See Weaver & Jones, supra note 5, at 316 (“Courts rarely examine whether these
harms really occur.”).
185. Id.; see Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 886-87.
186. Weaver & Jones, supra note 5, at 315-16.
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where the risk of disclosure is high or the incentive to communicate is
weak.187 However, where the risk of subsequent disclosure is low or
the incentive to communicate is significant, people are unlikely to
modify their communications.188
The protection of factual materials under the privilege presents
such a case where the risk of disclosure is low,189 yet incentive to
communicate is significant. Materials containing factual information
are usually prepared by lower-level officials.190 These lower-level officials have clear incentives to communicate. First, their job is to prepare such materials. Their employment may depend on preparing
these materials as thoroughly and completely as possible. Second,
lower-level officials will want to impress their superiors at the agency.
Few lower-level officials will want to retain those positions for their
entire careers. The credit they receive for performing their jobs well
may be reflected in future salary increases or promotions, while poor
performance may result in such promotions’ going to other employees. Finally, any political fallout from a decision likely would not
reach a lower-level official. Such employees are more likely to be
concerned with their employers’ opinions rather than with the opinions of the public at large. This is presumably why an individual’s position in the deliberative hierarchy is a factor that some courts consider in balancing the interests of litigants.191 This inquiry, however,
should not be delayed until the balancing phase of the analysis. The
fifth element of a prima facie demonstration that information is
privileged requires the government to demonstrate that it would be
impaired in acquiring this type of information absent the protection
of the privilege.192 Since materials containing factual information generally will not require protection from disclosure under this rationale,193 courts should not extend the scope of the privilege to protect
such materials.
187. See Developments in the Law – Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450,
1474-77 (1985) (collecting and summarizing empirical critiques).
188. See id.
189. Professor Wetlaufer argues that, under the deliberative process privilege generally, the
risk of disclosure is low. See Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 887-88. If the risk is low for disclosure
under the privilege generally, the risk is likely even lower that factual information will be disclosed.
190. See 2 STONE & TAYLOR, supra note 43, § 9.09, at 9-22 (recognizing that such material
is usually compiled prior to the start of any deliberative process or discussion).
191. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
192. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 55, at 197-98.
193. See 2 STONE & TAYLOR, supra note 43, § 9.09, at 9-21 to 9-22 (arguing that materials
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Additionally, the procedural requirements involved in successful
invocation of the privilege undermine this rationale with respect to
factual information. The lower-level officials who author the materials containing the facts in question are not allowed to assert the
privilege. Most courts require that the deliberative process privilege
be asserted by the agency head after personal consideration of the
matter in question.194 A privilege that is outside an individual’s control likely would not have any effect on that individual’s candor. Indeed, it is unlikely that a higher-level official would be encouraged to
communicate by a privilege that “is under the control of the political
head of the agency who will be only too happy to waive the privilege
when it serves his need to scapegoat his underlings for bad advice and
thus avoid political responsibility for bad agency decisions.”195 This
would be especially true for lower-level officials. Although a very
small percentage of lower-level officials might be discouraged from
communicating freely and openly, the courts should still follow the
Supreme Court’s reasoning and concern themselves only with
whether a reasonable person might be discouraged.196 Therefore, materials containing factual information generated by lower-level officials should only satisfy the fifth element of the prima facie case for
protection of the privilege when a reasonable government official’s
communications would be chilled.
Finally, some argue that disclosure of factual reports made by
lower-level officials would impede effective and efficient policy formulation by discouraging higher-level officials from requesting such
information.197 With the exception of the agency head,198 the same arprepared by lower-level officials are “less likely to require protection” under the rationale of
the privilege). Additionally, Justice Reed’s language in Kaiser “suggests that the [deliberative
process] privilege might be restricted to the deliberations of high-level administrative officials,
such as agency or department heads.” Weaver & Jones, supra note 5, at 299.
194. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
195. 26A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5680, at 131-32; see Wetlaufer, supra note 2,
at 888 (“[I]t is common knowledge that everyone who really matters will, at the earliest possible moment, publish his account of the deliberations in which he was involved.”).
196. See supra note 180.
197. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 187, at 1476-77 (collecting sources and
summarizing arguments that disclosure of factual reports by subordinates will chill communications of superiors).
198. It seems unlikely that there would be a sufficiently significant amount of factual material reported by lower-level officials in response to a request made directly by the head of an
agency to warrant additional analysis. However, the agency head would presumably have incentives similar to those of other higher-level officials discussed below. See infra notes 199-04
and accompanying text.
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guments concerning who can and cannot assert the privilege apply to
higher-level officials.199 Additionally, the interests of higher-level officials are best served by requesting such information, since higherlevel officials “are people who are presumed to be committed to the
success of the agency for which they work and who have a strong incentive to help solve problems that confront that agency and to get
credit for their contributions.”200 Just as lower-level officials, higherlevel officials have strong incentives to communicate and likewise
face a low risk of disclosure of those communications.201 Therefore,
the potential disclosure of factual information contained in reports by
lower-level officials is unlikely to affect the candor of higher-level officials.202
B. Risk of Premature Disclosure and Risk of Public Confusion
Two further justifications for the privilege involve the risks that
a government agency will be judged for what it considers, rather than
what it actually decides, and that public confusion may result from
premature disclosure of deliberative materials.203 These justifications
deal largely with “pending decisions and will seldom be applicable to
a disclosure in litigation.”204 These rationales should properly be considered to belong to FOIA, not to the deliberative process privilege
itself. The case law and commentary from which these two justifications arise deal with the application of FOIA Exemption 5.205 No
199. See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
200. Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 888.
201. See id. at 887-88.
202. See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
204. 26A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5680, at 131.
205. Mueller and Kirkpatrick cite one case and Stone and Taylor cite an additional case to
support the two rationales that they attribute to the deliberative process privilege. See
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 47, at 661 nn.6-7 (citing Jordan v. United States Dep’t
of Justice, 591 F.2d 753 (D.C. Dir. 1978)); 2 STONE & TAYLOR, supra note 43, § 9.09, at 9-22
n.120 (citing Jordan and Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854 (D.C.
Cir. 1980)). These cases, however, are really FOIA cases offering rationales for Exemption 5.
See Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 866-69; Jordan, 591 F.2d at 772-73. The United States District
Court for the District of Columbia attributed all three rationales discussed above to the deliberative process privilege rather than Exemption 5. See Chemical Weapons Working Group v.
United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 185 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1999) (mem.). The case cited
by Chemical Weapons Working Group to support its claim that all three purposes underlie the
common law privilege, however, is actually a FOIA case and articulates the underlying purposes of Exemption 5. See id. at 3 (citing Russell v. Department of the Air Force, 682 F.2d
1045, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citing Jordan, 591 F.2d at 772-73) (ruling on a FOIA Exemption 5

JENSEN TO PRINTER

01/12/00 11:37 AM

1999] REASONABLE GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL TEST

591

cases dealing solely with the deliberative process privilege have cited
these justifications for the privilege. These two rationales are not a
part of the prima facie case for invocation of the privilege,206 nor
should they be. Absent evidence of a danger of chilled communications, justice would be compromised if the government were allowed
to withhold relevant information from opposing litigants based on
claims that disclosure of such information would result in public confusion or a governmental agency’s being judged on what it considered, rather than on what it decided. Perhaps justice can allow the
government to protect deliberations in order to preserve the effective
functioning of government;207 however, absent evidence of chilled deliberations, public confusion is not congruent with ineffective government. Therefore, any application of these rationales to factual information reported by lower-level officials should be restricted to
cases in which disclosure is brought under FOIA.
C. The Morgan Doctrine
The final justification for the deliberative process privilege is
based upon the Morgan doctrine, which protects the thought processes of executive officials from judicial intrusion.208 The Morgan line
of cases209 “represent[s] a category of cases that are analytically and
functionally distinct from those that fall within the realm of the [deliberative process] privilege.”210 Morgan establishes a “quasi-judicial
deliberative privilege.”211 The Morgan Court was not dealing with deliberations for the formulation of policy, as protected by the deliberative process privilege, but with the deliberations of the Secretary of
claim)).
206. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 55, at 197-98; see also supra Section I.C.2. The fourth
and fifth prongs of the prima facie invocation of the privilege clearly incorporate considerations
of chilling, but the prima facie elements do not incorporate these two justifications.
207. Some commentators, however, have argued that even this protection is not required.
See supra note 7.
208. See supra notes 52-54. For further discussion of separation of powers issues with respect to the deliberative process privilege, see Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 899-905.
209. The Morgan line of cases includes: Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936)
[hereinafter Morgan I]; Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938) [hereinafter Morgan II];
United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183 (1939) [hereinafter Morgan III]; and United States v.
Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941) [hereinafter Morgan IV].
210. Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 906. Professor Wetlaufer also argues that Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), does not change this analysis. See Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 907-08.
211. Id. at 906.
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Agriculture, who was acting under congressional mandate to perform
“adjudicatory functions.”212 The proceeding was essentially a “judicial
proceeding,” and the Secretary had dealt with information in a manner closely resembling that of a judge.213 This proceeding had all the
essential elements of contested litigation,214 and the Secretary’s decision was subject to appeal.215 The Court viewed the proceedings as a
“collaborative instrumentalit[y] of justice”216 and accorded the Secretary “the same deference, respect and immunity it would have given
to another court.”217 Comparing the functions of an executive official
in a quasijudicial process to the functions of a judge, Morgan concluded that probing an executive’s thought processes in this context
would compromise the integrity of the quasijudicial proceeding.218
The cases relying on the Morgan doctrine as authority for the
deliberative process privilege generally do not account for the quasijudicial aspect of the decisions.219 However, the language that was so
central to the Morgan decisions must not be ignored. Courts should
not simply cite Morgan, without more, as justification for the deliberative process privilege. The Morgan doctrine should apply only in
those cases in which the information sought is part of an agency’s
quasijudicial activities.
Even if the Morgan doctrine applies to agency deliberations of a
non-quasijudicial nature, sound policy would not call for exclusion of
all materials potentially implicating the thought processes of any
member or employee of the executive branch, regardless of how low
that individual’s position is within the deliberative hierarchy. Primarily factual materials do not necessarily represent the thought processes of executive officials. Facts, by their very nature, have an existence independent of the thought process of government officials.
Consequently, the Morgan doctrine should not protect such factual
information. When litigants are seeking only the facts and have no

212. Morgan IV, 313 U.S. at 421.
213. Id. at 422.
214. See Morgan I, 298 U.S. at 479-80.
215. See Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 906.
216. Morgan IV, 313 U.S. at 422; accord Morgan III, 307 U.S. at 191.
217. Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 906; accord Morgan IV, 313 U.S. at 422; Morgan III, 307
U.S. at 191.
218. See Morgan IV, 313 U.S. at 422.
219. See Wetlaufer, supra note 2, at 906-08 (demonstrating the quasijudicial nature of the
Morgan line of cases and arguing that the Morgan doctrine is inapplicable in the deliberative
process privilege context).
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interest in reconstructing the mental processes of government officials, such facts should not fall within the reach of the Morgan doctrine.220 This should hold true even when largely factual materials reflect some part of the thought processes of lower-level officials (as in
the cases of fact selection). Some courts have already adopted this
approach.221
Assume arguendo that the Morgan doctrine does apply to deliberative process privilege cases. The interests of parties in litigation
with the government (who need access to relevant information), of
the federal judiciary (which needs access to facts to decide cases
properly), and of the federal government (which has an interest in
seeing federal law enforced and obeyed) would not be well served by
allowing executive officials to protect any facts they wished simply by
claiming that they were a part of their deliberative processes. The
Supreme Court of West Virginia adopted a more sound approach. It
refused to apply the privilege to factual matters, even if such material
might have been used by government decisionmakers in their deliberations.222 In so doing, the court’s decision prevented government
bureaucrats from shielding facts simply by funneling them through a
deliberative process. The Morgan doctrine should not provide executive officials with a means of thwarting justice by covering up all factual materials they may merely consider.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR THE TREATMENT OF FACTUAL INFORMATION
To strike the proper balance between the interests of the government litigant and the interests of the judiciary in promoting the
220. Similarly, the attorney-client privilege protects the communications between attorney
and client, but does not allow facts to become protected merely because they were considered
by an attorney. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981); 1 MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 89, at 356-60 (5th ed. 1999); 1 STONE & TAYLOR, supra note 43,
§ 1.24, at 1-77 to 1-79. An analogous situation is found in copyright law. The Supreme Court
has held that copyright law does not protect facts, but does protect compilations of facts. See
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346-49 (1991). However, even in
compilations of facts, the protected material is the organization itself. See id. Facts, even when
included in an otherwise protected compilation, are not protected. See id.
221. See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Department of Justice, 677 F.2d 931, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(concluding that the selection of facts that an executive official thinks are material does not by
itself warrant protection of those facts); Lurie v. Department of the Army, 970 F. Supp. 19, 34
(D.D.C. 1997).
222. See Daily Gazette Co. v. West Virginia Dev. Office, 482 S.E.2d 180, 190 (W. Va. 1996)
(“[T]he deliberative process privilege does not extend to materials which are factual in nature,
even if such material may have been used by government decision makers in their deliberations.”).
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search for truth, governmental privileges should be construed narrowly.223 Therefore, the deliberative process privilege should not be
extended beyond what is necessary to accomplish its underlying purposes.224 As argued above, factual information should not be protected by the privilege, regardless of whether it was selectively collected or summarized.225
In many cases, a distinction between fact and opinion may be
made by looking to the source of the information. If the information
exists independently and apart from a government official’s report, it
can properly be deemed a fact. On the other hand, if the sole source
of the information is the government official, the information is more
properly considered opinion. A class of information exists, however,
that could be categorized as something between purely factual data
and opinion (such as cost estimates, which are based partly on objective reality and partly on subjective evaluation of that reality). This
category of information has received conflicting treatment from the
circuit courts. In three 1992 cases, three circuits adopted different
tests to determine whether factual information should be protected
by the deliberative process privilege. The Eleventh Circuit adopted
the fact/opinion test whereby the court’s analysis depends on whether
material “reflect[s] the give-and-take of the consultive [sic] process.”226 The Eleventh Circuit expressly avoided analyzing whether disclosure of information would chill future deliberations.227 The Ninth
Circuit explicitly disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit and endorsed a
223. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (declaring that privileges are not
to be “lightly created or expansively construed”); see also supra notes 45-46 (citing cases stating
that the deliberative process privilege is to be narrowly construed).
224. See Gomez v. City of Nashua, 126 F.R.D. 432, 435 (D.N.H. 1989) (“The scope of the
privilege is limited by its underlying purpose and should not be applied where that purpose
would not be served.”).
225. In those cases in which the public disclosure of material outside the scope of the privilege might prove harmful to individuals or to the agency itself, a number of alternatives are
available. Where an individual might suffer harm or undue embarrassment from disclosure, the
identity of the author can be protected instead of protecting the information itself, as is currently done with the informer’s privilege. See 2 STONE & TAYLOR, supra note 43, § 9.11, at 9-35
to 9-36; 26A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 5680, at 131-32; Weaver & Jones, supra note
5, at 298. Additionally, a variety of protective orders are available under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(c)(7), such as limiting inspection to certain individuals. See 2 STONE & TAYLOR,
supra note 43, § 9.11, at 9-35 to 9-36.
226. Florida House of Representatives v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 961 F.2d 941,
949 (11th Cir. 1992); see also supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
227. See id. (“To engage in such an additional analysis contradicts the very premise that the
distinction relies on, namely, that data classified as advice or opinion necessarily involves the
deliberative process.”).
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functional test determining whether “revealing the information exposes the deliberative process.”228 The implicit assumption in this test
is that exposing the deliberative process would chill deliberations
within an agency. The D.C. Circuit adopted a test more in keeping
with the purposes of the privilege. The court concluded that the “key
question” in these cases is “whether disclosure would tend to diminish candor within an agency.”229 The D.C. Circuit later clarified this
test, explaining that the focus should be on the relationship between
the higher-level official and the information in question.230 Thus, the
analysis under the Petroleum Information–Mapother test focuses on
whether the deliberations of a higher-level official would be impaired
by the disclosure of factual information reported by a lower-level official.
A. The “Reasonable Government Official Test”
In cases regarding factual information that also seems to be deliberative, a modification of the test adopted by the D.C. Circuit is
more in keeping with justifications of the privilege. The first four
prongs of the test would be identical to those of the test for determining the availability of the deliberative process privilege in general:
(1) the information must be predecisional, (2) the information must
be deliberative, (3) the government must have maintained confidentiality, and (4) the government must show that it has a legitimate
need for the information.231 Under the fifth prong of this test, the requirement that the government be impaired in acquiring this type of
information absent the protection of the privilege,232 there are two
primary considerations: (a) the position in the deliberative hierarchy
of the author of the materials containing the information in question,
and (b) the likelihood that a reasonable person in that position would
be discouraged from communicating freely and openly by the disclosure of that information. This “reasonable government official test,”
proposed by this Note, is more in accord with the legitimate purposes
and proper scope of the privilege.
228. Assembly of Cal. v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 968 F.2d 916, 921 (9th Cir.
1992); see also supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
229. Petroleum Info. Corp. v. United States Dep’t of the Interior, 976 F.2d 1429, 1435 (D.C.
Cir. 1992); see also supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
230. See Mapother v. Department of Justice, 3 F.3d 1533, 1539 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also
supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 69-99.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
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The test adopted by the Eleventh Circuit stops short in its analysis of whether information should be privileged. The fifth and final
element of a prima facie case under the deliberative process privilege
is whether denial of the privilege would impair the free flow of information within the agency.233 Not only must material be deliberative, but its disclosure must also pose the risk of chilling the exchange
of similar information in the future. The Ninth Circuit’s test implicitly
included all five elements of the deliberative process privilege analysis, but did not provide guidance as to the court’s focus in determining whether disclosure of factual material would chill future deliberations. The test employed by the D.C. Circuit is more refined, not only
focusing on whether disclosure would diminish candor, but also noting the position in the deliberative hierarchy to which a court should
look in determining whether future deliberations would be chilled.
However, as discussed above, the proper focus in these cases is not
the higher-level officials within an agency, but rather the lower-level
officials who were the authors of the documents containing the information in question.
The reasonable government official test would correct these deficiencies and direct a court’s attention to the proper factors for
analysis. In applying the test, courts should assume that a determination of risk of chilling future communications is an element of the
prima facie assertion of the privilege. Additionally, the reasonable
government official test would properly focus on the lower-level officials who were the authors of the information in question, rather than
on the agency heads. By so doing, the test would concentrate on the
individual whose communications would be potentially chilled—the
author of the documents containing the information.234 Moreover, this
test would eliminate the potential injustice resulting from allowing a
higher-level official to bring factual information within the scope of
the privilege simply by considering or reviewing that information.
The reasonable government official test, by concentrating on the
actual dangers sought to be prevented by the deliberative process

233. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 55, at 197-98; see also supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
234. Alternatively, if a higher-level official submits a request for specific facts, that official
may properly be deemed the source of the information. In such a case, the higher-level official
should be selected in step one of the reasonable government official test. Cf. Soucie v. David,
448 F.2d 1067, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (arguing that factual materials prepared in response to
specific questions by a government official may be protected since they would expose the official’s deliberative processes to unnecessary public scrutiny).
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privilege, more closely adheres to the principle that privileges should
not be “expansively construed.”235 Focusing on the position of the
government official reporting the factual information, as well as determining whether a reasonable government official in such a position would likely be discouraged from free and open communication
by the disclosure of the factual information, establishes the boundaries of the privilege within appropriate parameters. By so limiting the
privilege, the risk of unjustified expansion of the privilege to protect
factual information is minimized. Decreasing this unjustified expansion protects against the principal dangers of expansively construed
governmental privileges: depriving litigants from accessing information relevant to litigation with the federal government and compromising the integrity of the judicial system by allowing bureaucrats to
shield unjustifiably factual information from the judicial process.236
B. The Reasonable Government Official Test and FOIA Exemption 5
Since analysis of disclosure requests under Exemption 5 is similar to the prima facie analysis under the deliberative process privilege,237 the reasonable government official test would substantially affect disclosure requests under FOIA, as well as under the common
law privilege. However, the underlying rationale of FOIA and Exemption 5 differs from that of the deliberative process privilege. The
purpose of FOIA is to encourage disclosure,238 although this is limited
by exemptions such as Exemption 5.239 Courts have concluded that
“Congress intended to confine exemption (b)(5) as narrowly ‘as [is]
consistent with efficient Government operation.’”240 In accordance
with this concept of efficient government operation, the courts have
identified two additional purposes of Exemption 5 beyond the purposes of the common law privilege: (1) “protect[ing] the public from

235. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974); see also supra notes 45-46 (citing
cases stating that the deliberative process privilege is to be narrowly construed).
236. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 127-40 and accompanying text.
238. See Assembly of Cal. v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 968 F.2d 916, 920 (9th Cir.
1992).
239. There are nine exemptions in all. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9).
240. Senate of P.R. v. Department of Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting
Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); accord
Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1997);
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 1241, 1248 (4th Cir. 1994); Wolfe v. Department of Health and
Human Servs., 839 F.2d 768, 774-75 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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the confusion that would result from premature exposure to discussions occurring before the policies affecting it had actually been settled upon,”241 and (2) “protect[ing] the integrity of the decisionmaking process itself by confirming that ‘officials should be judged by
what they decided[,] not for matters they considered before making
up their minds.’”242
The reasonable government official test is designed to advance
the purposes of the deliberative process privilege, not Exemption 5.
However, since Exemption 5 analysis focuses on whether materials
are available to a party in litigation with a government agency,243 any
test established under the deliberative process privilege should still
be the beginning of the analysis of deliberative materials requested
under FOIA. The reasonable government official test can then be
brought into accordance with the underlying rationale of Exemption
5 by adding two elements to the test: (1) whether the disclosure of the
information requested under FOIA results in public confusion from
premature exposure to deliberative materials predating final policy
adoption,244 and (2) whether the disclosure would compromise the integrity of the deliberative process by allowing officials to be judged
by what they considered rather than by what they decided.245 These
additional elements will bring this expanded reasonable government
official test into accordance with the underlying rationale of FOIA
Exemption 5 by focusing on the rationale of the exemption itself.
This analysis, properly applied, will also decrease the risk that Exemption 5 will be construed in an overly broad manner.
CONCLUSION
The deliberative process privilege is a common law privilege designed to protect information that, if released, would diminish the

241. Russell v. Department of the Air Force, 682 F.2d 1045, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting
Jordan v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 591 F.2d 753, 772-73 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
242. Id. (quoting Jordan, 591 F.2d at 773).
243. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5).
244. This prong, however, would generally be applicable only to pending decisions and
would “seldom be applicable to a disclosure in litigation.” 26A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra
note 2, § 5680, at 131.
245. One court, in a different context, has already applied a test that focuses on the effect of
disclosure in light of these underlying purposes. See Chemical Weapons Working Group v.
United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 185 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1999) (mem.) (focusing on the
underlying purposes of the deliberative process privilege in determining whether the privilege
was applicable to allegedly factual information).
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candor within government agency deliberations. Generally, factual
information is not protected from disclosure by this privilege. However, in cases in which the distinction between fact and opinion becomes obscured, three circuits have adopted different tests to determine whether the deliberative process privilege applies. By not
focusing on the theoretical underpinnings of the privilege, these tests
create the risk that factual material will be unjustifiably exempted
from disclosure to litigants. Expansively construing the privilege in
this manner compromises the judicial process by denying relevant information to participants in the adversarial process, decreasing public
confidence in judicial fora, and contravening governmental interests
in enforcing federal law.
The “reasonable government official” test corrects some of these
deficiencies and ensures that the privilege will be construed in conformity with its underlying rationale of protecting against the chilling
of deliberative communications. The test accomplishes this goal by
directing the focus of the analysis to the position within the deliberative hierarchy of the government official preparing the information in
question. It then determines whether a reasonable person in that position would be discouraged from free and open communication by
the disclosure of the information. The test thereby strikes the proper
balance between the government’s interest in open and efficient
communications, the opposing litigant’s interest in acquiring access to
relevant information, the judiciary’s interest in maintaining the integrity of the judicial process and serving justice, and the federal government’s interest in securing compliance with federal law.

